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.ANTrrn.usT LAws-CoNCERTED REFusALS To DEAL-PUBLIC INJURY-
Petitioner, Klor's, Inc., a retail electrical appliance store, brought a treble 
damage action against Broadway-Hale, a department store chain, and 
against ten appliance manufacturers, alleging conspiracy to restrain and 
monopolize commerce in violation of sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The complaint charged essentially that Broadway-Hale, which operated a 
store next door to Klor's, had been able by virtue of ii:s great buying power 
to induce a concerted refusal to deal on the part of major appliance manu-
facturers, so that they would sell to Klor's only on highly unfavorable 
terms if at all. Respondents submitted affidavits which showed that hun-
dreds of appliance dealers flourished in the area in which Klor's was lo-
cated, dealing in the branded merchandise which Klor's could not obtain 
from respondent manufacturers. The district court granted respondents' 
motion for summary judgment, holding that no public injury was present, 
and describing the controversy as a "purely private quarrel." The· Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded for trial.1 Since group boy-
cotts are within that class of restraints which from the~r very nature and 
character are unduly restrictive, Congress has determined its own criteria 
of public injury as to them. Thus petitioner has stated a cause of action. 
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
Although Supreme Court dictum has often characterized concerted re-
fusals to deal as unreasonable per se,2 the fact that cases relied upon to 
support that view have involved improper purposes or effects3 which would 
lead to condemnation under a rule of reason approach had left open the 
possibility that such an approach was not precluded in group boycott 
cases.4 The principal case, with its broad malediction of concerted refusals 
1 Justice Harlan concurred on the ground that respondents' affidavits did not neces• 
sarily constitute a defense irrespective of what petitioner may be able to prove at the trial. 
2 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522 (1948); Times-Picayune 
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 625 (1953). 
8 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) 
(price fixing); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 
(1914) (elimination of competition); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457 (1941) (elimination of competition). 
4 United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956) 144 F. Supp. 684 
at 698: "In none of the cited cases was the decision of the Supreme Court based upon 
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to deal, would seem to put to rest all doubts concerning the classification 
of group boycotts as per se violations of the antitrust laws.15 The Court 
makes no reference to limitations which would except self-restricting, non-
coercive refusals to deal (e.g., reasonable rules among members of trading 
boards or exchanges) from the operation of the per se rule, a possible indi-
cation that such suggested limitations6 will not be applied. Justifications 
for group refusals to deal such as prevention of illegal relationships,7 credit 
regulation,8 and elimination of trade abuses9 may not be totally without 
force, but their applicability in the unreasonable per se setting will have 
to be tested in future cases. Since a violation of the Sherman Act neces-
sarily is injurious to the public,10 classification of group boycotts as unrea-
sonable per se frees the plaintiff in a private action based upon such prac-
tices from the requirement of establishing that degree of public injury 
which is an element of any antitrust violation. 
On remand, Klor's will be presented with the evidentiary problem of 
proving conspiracy on the part of the respondent manufacturers. Unless the 
contemporaneous similar action of the manufacturers can circumstantially 
create an inference of conspiracy beyond mere "conscious parallelism,"11 
the application of the principle that all boycotts are illegal per se. Having forebome 
the declaration of such a principle in cases where group refusals to deal were directly 
in issue, it is unreasonable to suppose that the court intended to announce such a 
principle in cases where the issue was not presented." Note, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1035 (1957). 
Accord, United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 915, 
affd. per curiam 355 U.S. 22 (1957). 
5 The Court distinguished individual refusals to deal and exclusive distributorship 
contracts from the agreement alleged in the principal case. Cf. United States v. Colgate 
&: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
6 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAws (1955): " ••. group action coercing outside parties is deemed an undue 
restraint of trade, and whatever its purpose, is likely to fall as unreasonable per se." 
(Italics added.) See also comment, 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 628 (1956). 
7 See United States v. American Livestock Cominission Co., 279 U.S. 435 (1929). 
s See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See also, note, 41 CoL. L. 
REv. 941 (1941). Cf. Ruddy Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British &: Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 
(7th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 86, cert. den. 344 U.S. 816 (1952). 
9 See Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 522 at 527. See, generally, 
LAMB AND KrI"rELLE, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE c. 10 (1956). 
10 "Congress has, by legislative fiat, deterinined that such prohibited activities are 
injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect the victiins of forbidden prac-
tices as well as the public .••. In the face of such a policy this Court should not add 
requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Con-
gress in those laws." Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 at 453-454 (1957). 
11 "It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without 
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators. . . • Acceptance by 
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the 
necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is 
sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." Interstate Circuit, 
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939). See note, 64 YALE L.J. 581 (1955). 
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the problem of proving an agreement is likely to be a· difficult one. While 
uniform behavior is certainly relevant evidence of agreement, it is now 
clear that more is necessary to establish conspiracy under the antitrust 
laws.12 If Klor's is unable to prove conspiracy, it would seetn at first glance 
that its only remedy against Broadway-Hale would be in a tort action for 
interference with business relationships.13 However, it is at least arguable 
that Broadway-Hale had a predatory purpose which was effectuated through 
sales contracts entered into with the manufacturers on condition that ap-
pliances be withheld from Klor's. In that event, a "contract in restraint of 
trade" would be present.14 It should be noted, however, that if Klor's is to 
prevail under this theory, it will be necessary for it to show public injury. 
Unlike the situation involving an unreasonable per se violation, where 
public injury will be deemed to have been determined by Congress, proof 
of a violation in the normal case must include the component of injury to 
competition.15 Such injury might be found in the deterrent effect which 
Klor's fate, if unredressed, will have upon other small dealers.16 The poten-
tiality of such competitive restraint resulting from Broadway-Hale's action 
is as great as would be that resulting from a conspiracy among the manufac-
turers, and it would seem anomalous to deny Klor's recovery in the event 
that conspiracy could not be proved. 
Jerome S. Traum, S.Ed. 
12 Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 at 
541 (1954): " •.• 'conscious parallelism' ·has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman 
Act entirely." Cf. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY 
THE ANTITRUST l.Aws 36-42 (1955). 
13 See, e.g., Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111 (1891), where plaintiff butcher 
was held to have a cause of action against cattle dealers who boycotted him and induced 
a third person to refuse to sell him supplies. 
14 In FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924), it was held that a whole-
sale dealer in groceries had the right unilaterally to refuse to buy from a grocery manu-
facturer unless the manufacturer ceased making direct sales to a competitor whose primary 
business was operation of a retail chain. The principal case might be differentiated on 
the ground that Raymond Bros.-Clark Co. was furthering a proper business interest 
(preservation of customer classifications), whereas there was no apparent legitimate 
business purpose being served by Broadway-Hale's course of action. 
15 Cf. Radovich v. National Football League, note 10 supra. 
16 See note, 68 YALE L.J. 949 at 956 (1959). 
